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ABSTRACT
Software security is undoubtedly a major concern in today’s soft-
ware engineering. Although the level of awareness of security issues
is often high, practical experiences show that neither preventive ac-
tions nor reactions to possible issues are always addressed properly
in reality. By analyzing large quantities of commits in the open-
source communities, we can categorize the vulnerabilities mitigated
by the developers and study their distribution, resolution time, etc.
to learn and improve security management processes and practices.
With the help of the Software Heritage Graph Dataset, we inves-
tigated the commits of two of the most popular script languages –
Python and JavaScript – projects collected from public repositories
and identified those that mitigate a certain vulnerability in the code
(i.e. vulnerability resolution commits). On the one hand, we identi-
fied the types of vulnerabilities (in terms of CWE groups) referred
to in commit messages and compared their numbers within the two
communities. On the other hand, we examined the average time
elapsing between the publish date of a vulnerability and the first
reference to it in a commit.
We found that there is a large intersection in the vulnerability
types mitigated by the two communities, but most prevalent vulner-
abilities are specific to language. Moreover, neither the JavaScript
nor the Python community reacts very fast to appearing security
vulnerabilities in general with only a couple of exceptions for cer-
tain CWE groups.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Software security is one of the most striking problems of today’s
software systems. Large impact security vulnerabilities are explored
on a daily basis, for example, a serious flaw [21] has been discovered
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in ’Sudo’, a powerful utility used in macOS this February. Security
problems can cause not just financial damage [2], but can compro-
mise vital infrastructure, or used to threaten entire countries.
Our focus in this paper is to examine vulnerability mitigation (i.e.
corrective code changes to resolve security vulnerabilities) within
the open-source community and their typical types. We specifi-
cally target Python and JavaScript open-source projects as these
languages are very popular and widely used in many domains to-
day. By getting a detailed picture of what security vulnerabilities
and when are mitigated in the open-source community of these
languages, we can identify vulnerability categories that are not suf-
ficiently addressed, explore patterns that might help to build more
efficient vulnerability prediction models, or even discover some
patterns that may help in generalizing the models. We investigate
the following two research questions in this work:
RQ1:What are the typical security vulnerability types the JavaScript
and Python open-source communities mitigate and how do they relate
to each other?
RQ2: How quickly the JavaScript and Python open-source commu-
nities mitigate a newly published security vulnerability?
Based on the rich set of data in the Software Heritage Graph
Dataset [15], we found that the JavaScript projects refer to secu-
rity vulnerabilities falling into 87 different categories, the Python
projects to 71, out of which 55 security vulnerability categories
are common. For vulnerability categorization, we use the widely
adopted Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) list [5]. Despite
the large intersection in the security vulnerability types, the num-
ber of mitigated vulnerabilities differ significantly depending on the
language of the projects. For example, Cross-site Scripting (CWE-
79), Path Traversal (CWE-22), Improper Input Validation (CWE-20)
and Uncontrolled Resource Consumption (CWE-400) type of vulner-
abilities are mitigated mostly in JavaScript projects, while Resource
Management Errors (CWE-399) and Permissions, Privileges, and
Access Controls (CWE-264) are mitigated mostly in Python.
The growing number of vulnerability mitigating commits is a
common tendency in both languages, but it is proportionate to the
growth of the total number of commits. The vulnerability mitigation
per total commit ratio increases only slowly, however, there was
a significant increase in the amount of vulnerability mitigation in
the year 2018 for both JavaScript and Python projects (see Figure 1).
Regarding the number of days elapsing between the publish date of
a particular security vulnerability and the date of the first commit
with its mitigation is varying to a large extent. Typically, Python
commits mitigate vulnerabilities no older than 100 days, while some
JavaScript commits mitigate vulnerabilities older than a year.
ar
X
iv
:2
00
6.
13
65
2v
1 
 [c
s.S
E]
  2
4 J
un
 20
20
Conference’17, July 2017, Washington, DC, USA Gábor Antal, Márton Keleti, and Péter Hegedűs
2 APPROACH
Our approach is based on collecting the vulnerability mitigation
commits for JavaScript and Python projects from the dataset, which
are potentially connected to a public CVE [3] entry. To achieve
this, we used a very simple but effective heuristics-based approach,
similar to those widely used in works related to bug data collec-
tion [13, 20]. First, we searched for the commits containing the
patterns “CVE-”, “CWE-”, “NVD-” (all of them are case insensitive)
in their commit messages using SQL queries. Referring to a CVE or
CWE identifier in the commit message is a widely used practice in
case of vulnerability mitigation patches, so the community can un-
derstand why the given commit is extremely important and urgent
to be merged. By filtering the revision table, we created a tempo-
ral table called cve_revs with 357,757 rows (from the original 1.26
billion rows).
After the first filtering step, we had to identify the programming
language of the project a given commit belongs to. Since the struc-
ture of the database did not provide an effective way to do this, we
used the information retrieved from the revisions’ root directory:
• We considered a revision as a Python revision if its root
directory contained either __init.py__ or setup.py. With-
out at least one of these files, the project cannot be used as
a Python module [16, 18, 25] (nor published on PyPI [17]),
therefore it is a viable heuristics to detect Python projects.
• We considered a revision to be a JavaScript one if its root
directory contained either index.js, app.js, server.js as
one of these files will most likely be included in the root
directory [11] of a JavaScript project. We did not consider
package.json for identifying a revision as a JavaScript revi-
sion because package.json is often used in other languages
as well, such as PHP (e.g. Symfony uses package.json to
manage tools that are necessary for packing the application’s
frontend [22]).
Based on this second round of filtering, we got 3,718 rows for
Python and 4,136 rows for JavaScript, which we stored in two new
tables: cve_revs_py and cve_revs_js, respectively. We analyzed
the data collected in these instead of the original revision table.
2.1 Tools and Queries for Data Mining
We processed the collected Python and JavaScript revisions using
Python scripts and pandas [10], and used regular expressions1 to
find and extract the CVE/CWE IDs from the commit messages.
All the used regular expressions and extraction scripts for finding
CVE/CWE and vulnerability mitigating revisions are available in
our online asset package.2 We also tried to filter commits for “NVD”,
but there were no matching commit messages. If a commit message
contained more than one CVE or CWE references, we extracted all
and considered them separately (i.e. the commit contained mitiga-
tion for more than one vulnerabilities). As a commit message can
contain the same CVE/CWE IDs several times (for example, it can
be in the first line of the commit message and later it can appear in
the description as well), we had to remove the duplicates. Thus one
CVE/CWE entry is considered only once per revision.
1(CV E − \d {4} − \d {4, }), (CW E − [\d ]{1, 4}), and (NVD .+)
2https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3699486
Several rows has not been filtered out in the first step, but in
the processing step we could not find any CVE/CWE IDs in their
commit messages. We examined and validated all of these cases by
hand. These revisions contained messages that could pass our first
filtering but did not mention any valid CVE/CWE IDs, for example,
execve-safe, Glennvd-patch-1, nvd-downloader, no CVE-id.
As we focused on the types of vulnerabilities, which can be de-
scribed by the CWE identifier of the security problem category the
vulnerability belongs to, we had to link each CVE entries to the
corresponding CWE categories of the vulnerabilities. To achieve
this, we relied on the data provided by the National Vulnerability
Database [12] and used a customized version of CVEmanager by At-
lasis [4] to parse the JSON data files describing the CVE entries with
meta-information, like its corresponding CWE category. Besides
the CWE group of a CVE entry, we also extracted the publishing
date, severity, and the base impact score of every CVE entries.
Some revisions contained references to CWE groups without
mentioning any specific CVE entries. These revisions were mapped
directly to the referenced CWE categories.
2.2 Software Heritage Graph Dataset Version
We performed our study using the compressed PostgreSQL for-
mat [14] of the full Software Heritage Graph Dataset [15]. It took
us several tries to correctly import the dataset into a local database.
With some modifications to the original load script (e.g. remov-
ing concurrent index creation), we managed to import the whole
database into a local server.
The technical specifications of the database server we used were
20-core Intel CPU (2,6 GHz), 90 Gbs of RAM, 5 Tb SSD. Despite the
quite strong hardware, the data import and queries were rather slow
due to the enormous size of the database. To speed up the process,
we created intermediate tables from the relevant information in a
filtered and transformed way.
3 RESULTS
After all filtering steps, we identified a total number of 3,458 vulner-
ability mitigation commits (i.e. commit messages containing valid
CVE or CWE IDs) for JavaScript and 2,884 for Python to which we
were able to resolve the corresponding CWE security type groups
as well. Figure 1 shows the ratio of commits over the years in terms
of the average number of vulnerability mitigation commits per 100k
commits.
Figure 1: Vulnerability mitigation ratio per year
While Python vulnerability mitigation ratio is quite stable, the
same ratio for JavaScript projects grows consistently from 2015,
with a large peak in 2018, but is still lower than that of Python
projects. As there are no JavaScript commits in Software Heritage
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Figure 2: Number of security issues found with the given CWE types
Dataset before 2010, and the data for 2019 is still incomplete, we
omitted those years from the analysis. Table 1 provides further
details on the number of detected vulnerability mitigation commits
and the total number of commits in the analyzed years. The distri-
bution of the referenced CWE vulnerability types are depicted in
Figure 2.
Table 1: Commit statistics per year
Year Vuln. JS Vuln. PY Total JS Total PY
2010 0 225 102,525 1,597,160
2011 0 67 675,492 2,068,155
2012 6 343 2,078,887 2,663,836
2013 41 209 5,705,696 3,436,804
2014 84 291 12,692,836 4,440,660
2015 111 328 23,794,463 5,537,294
2016 239 453 38,990,699 6,527,350
2017 393 329 40,883,417 6,835,803
2018 2584 639 37,729,971 6,315,866
3.1 Typical Security Issue Types (RQ1)
To answer RQ1, we examined the extracted vulnerability mitiga-
tion commits with 103 different CWE categories. From these 103,
55 CWE types occurred in both JavaScript and Python commit
messages, while 32 CWE groups were found only in JavaScript
projects, while 16 only in Python projects (however, the number of
vulnerabilities with such types were very low).
We examined the most popular CWE categories in more detail.
The CWEs having at least 150 references in either of the analyzed
languages are as follows:
• CWE-79 – Improper Neutralization of Input During Web
Page Generation (Cross-site Scripting).
• CWE-399 – Resource Management Errors.
• CWE-200 – Information Exposure.
• CWE-20 – Improper Input Validation.
• CWE-264 – Permissions, Privileges, and Access Controls.
• CWE-400 – Uncontrolled Resource Consumption.
• CWE-119 – Improper Restriction of Operations within the
Bounds of a Memory Buffer.
• CWE-22 – Improper Limitation of a Path-name to a Restricted
Directory (Path Traversal).
Interestingly, except for CWE-200 that is the type of the vulnera-
bilities mitigated in more than 200 commits in both languages, each
of the other six CWE groups can be attributed to either JavaScript
or Python projects (i.e. one of the languages contain the majority of
the mitigation to these vulnerability types). On the one hand, Cross-
site Scripting (CWE-79), Path Traversal (CWE-22), Improper In-
put Validation (CWE-20) and Uncontrolled Resource Consumption
(CWE-400) type of vulnerabilities are mitigated mostly in JavaScript
projects. All these vulnerability types are primarily relevant for
web applications, where JavaScript is heavily used at the client-
side, thus it is more probable that a JavaScript project encounters
such vulnerabilities. On the other hand, mitigation of Resource
Management Errors (CWE-399), Permissions, Privileges, and Ac-
cess Controls (CWE-264), and Improper Restriction of Operations
within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer (CWE-119) type of vulnera-
bilities occur in Python commits mostly. These are more relevant
at the server-side, where Python seems to dominate. There is a
significant overlap in these categories as well, so projects from both
languages have vulnerabilities with all these CWE types, but based
on the data we have, it seems that these are more typical for a
particular language.
3.2 Reaction Times to Security Issues (RQ2)
To answer RQ2, we analyzed the average number of days elapsing
between a mitigation commit date and the publish date of a CVE
entrymentioned in that commit. Figure 3 depicts a general overview
of these average number of days per year. We can see that it takes
about 100 days on average for both communities to start mitigating
a public vulnerability in their code-base, with some peaks in years
2010 and 2014 for Python and 2017 for JavaScript. Therefore, we can
conclude that at a very general level, neither the JavaScript nor the
Python communities react fast to appearing vulnerabilities in their
code. It would be also interesting to see, if there are reported CVE
entries that are never mitigated in reality, but it would require an
entirely different methodology and could be a good future research.
Figure 3: Average number of days between mitigation com-
mit date and CVE publish date grouped by years
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We also examined the eight most prevalent CWE categories from
the same aspect. The average number of days elapsed between
the publish date of a CVE entry and the date of its mitigation
commit for the top eight CWEs are shown in Figure 4. The Python
community reacts 1.5-14 times faster to these type of vulnerabilities
than the JavaScript community; most of the mitigation commits
appear 50 days or less after the publish date of the corresponding
vulnerabilities. In the case of JavaScript, only vulnerabilities from
three CWE categories enjoy extra care (CWE-20, CWE-200, CWE-
400), all the others are mitigated after at least 100 days.
Figure 4: Average number of days between commit date and
issue publish date for the most common CWEs
The JavaScript community reacts exceptionally fast to informa-
tion exposure (CWE-200) type of vulnerabilities (after only 32.5
days on average), while improper input validation (CWE-20) and
uncontrolled resource consumption (CWE-400) are mitigated after
about 50 days on average. Interestingly, the vulnerabilities falling
into the CWE categories characteristic to Python (CWE-264, CWE-
399, and CWE-119) are mitigated after 200 days or more.
4 RELATEDWORK
By exploring the life-cycle of the vulnerabilities [6, 19], one can un-
derstand their nature better, which helps to find or predicting them.
Analogously to general bug prediction models, specific vulnerabil-
ity prediction models have been introduced [7, 9]. A big question
regarding them is how well they generalize across projects (or even
across languages) [1].
In their work, Li et Paxson [8] conducted a large-scale empirical
study (with over 4000 security patches) to investigate the vulnera-
bility fix development life cycle and its characteristics, compared
to the non-security bug fixing life cycle and characteristics. They
revealed that third of all security fixes are introduced more than 3
years after publishing.
Xu et al. [24] proposed a binary-level patch analysis framework
called SPAIN, which identifies security (and non-security) patches
by analyzing the binaries. The framework also detects patch and
vulnerability patterns that can be used to detect similar patch-
es/vulnerabilities in the given binaries. In contrast to this work, we
analyzed the source code changes mitigating vulnerabilities.
Vásquez et al. [23] analyzed 660 Android-related vulnerabilities
and their fixes. They used both NVD and Google Android security
bulletins to collect their data. Their analysis include vulnerability
types and the hierarchical relationship between vulnerabilities, the
impacted components and the survivability of the vulnerabilities.
We instead analyzed JavaScript and Python vulnerabilities.
5 THREATS TO VALIDITY
We had to apply heuristics to determine the language of the projects
(as the exact solution would have been practically infeasible due to
the database structure). Due to this, we might have omitted some
projects as well as identified some projects wrongly. However, as
our heuristics are based on widely established guidelines and best
practices that most of the projects follow, the number of these
projects should be minimal.
In most of the cases the committers mention CVE IDs explicitly,
however, there are unusual references, for example “Fixed XSS (with
CVE number 2020-100)” or “CVE-2020-20500/330/34/345”. Also,
there is a chance that a committer mentions a CVE in a context
that is not related to fixing its underlying security issue. In such
cases, we might drop valid vulnerability mitigation commits or
include invalid ones. To estimate the impact of this threat, we
manually evaluated 700 randomly selected commit messages from
the identified revisions. In the vast majority of the evaluated cases,
the commit messages refer to CVE IDs as we anticipated, thus the
impact of this threat should be minimal.
6 CONCLUSIONS
Using the Software Heritage Graph Dataset, we analyzed the vul-
nerability mitigation commits in the Python and JavaScript projects
from two aspects. On the one hand, we identified the types of
vulnerabilities (in terms of CWE groups) referred to in commit mes-
sages and compared their numbers within the two communities.
The percentage of vulnerability mitigation commits compared to
the total number of commits in projects show a growing tendency
(sharper in case of JavaScript, slower for Python). We detected 103
different CWE groups out of which 55 appeared in both languages
projects. From the eight most prevalent vulnerability types, one
was mitigated by both communities in equal numbers (CWE-200),
but four (CWE-20, CWE-22, CWE-79, CWE-400) was typical to
JavaScript, while three (CWE-399, CWE-264, CWE-119) to Python
projects. This suggests that JavaScript and Python communities
suffer the most from different types of vulnerabilities.
On the other hand, we examined the average time elapsing be-
tween the publish date of a vulnerability and the date of the commit
mitigating it. We found that in general, neither the JavaScript nor
the Python community reacts very fast to appearing vulnerabilities
(i.e. it takes more than 100 days on average to mitigate a vulnera-
bility after its publish date). However, this reaction is 1.5-14 times
faster in the Python community for the most common CWE cate-
gories (even to the ones more typical to JavaScript projects), while
the JavaScript community seems to take special care only of three
CWE categories: CWE-200, CWE-20, and CWE-400.
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